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Life Estate With Power of Appointment:
An Exception to the Terminable Interest Rule
UNDER THE LAW of community property states, a one-half in-
terest in the property held by a husband and wife is not part of
the decedent's gross estate and, therefore, is not subject to federal
estate tax until the death of the surviving spouse, provided that she
retained ownership of the same until her demise.1 Approximately
the same beneficial federal estate tax treatment can now be obtained
in every state by utilizing the congressionally created marital deduc-
tion2 which was designed to equalize the impact of federal estate
taxation upon residents of community property states and residents
of states that apply the common law of property Nevertheless, a
property interest which is "terminable" will not qualify for the mari-
tal deduction.4 The interest of the surviving spouse is considered
to be "terminable" when all of the following factors are present:
(1) The interest may fail upon the lapse of time or upon the occur-
rence or nonoccurrence of a particular event or contingency;5 (2)
The interest has or may pass to a person other than the surviving
spouse for less than full consideration;6 and (3) Such other person
may possess or enjoy any part of the property after the failure of
the estate vested in the surviving spouse.7
I Stein, How to Provide for the Marital Deduction by Will, in 1 LASSER, ESTATE
TAX TECHNIQuES 101 (1964). As a matter of convenience, the feminine pronoun
"she" will be used in the text; the discussion to follow will be equally applicable to a
male surviving spouse.
2 This deduction was created by the Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, §§ 351, 361, 62
Stat. 110, 116-17, through the repeal of the 1942 Community Property Amendments
to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 and through the splitting of estate and gift taxes.
The repealed amendments had failed to achieve equalization in community property
states because of the rigid requirement that the portion of the community contributed
by each spouse must be identified. This tracing problem was remedied by the imple-
mentation of the income-splitting joint return and the extensions of the benefits of
community property law to common law property states. See BrRrxs FEDERAL IN-
comE, EsTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 1110-13 (3d ed. 1964).
3 For an excellent discussion on basic policy, see Sugarman, Estate and Gift Tax
Equalization - the Marital Deduction, 36 CALIF. L. REv. 223 (1948). As to whether
equalization has actually been achieved, see Anderson, The Marital Deduction and
Equalization Under the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes Between Common Law and Com-
munity Property States, 54 MIcH. L. REv. 1087 (1956). See also Estate of Ellis v.
Commissioner, 252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958).
4 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (1) [hereinafter cited as CODE 5].
5 Ibid.
0 CODE 5 2056(b) (1) (A).
7 CODE 5 2056(b) (1) (B). Even if the interest passing to the surviving spouse is
not disallowed under subparagraphs A and B, the interest will be declared terminable
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This Note will address itself to a valuable exception to the
"terminable" interest rule. Section 2056(b) (5) of the Internal
Revenue Code grants the tax-saving marital deduction to the dece-
dent's gross estate when the surviving spouse has been given a life
estate (even though the estate will of its very nature terminate on
the lapse of time, namely, upon the demise of the life beneficiary)
coupled with a power to appoint the corpus.' In essence, the estate
tax regulations declare that the surviving spouse must be entitled
for life to all of the income from the entire interest or a specific por-
tion thereof,9 and that this income must be payable to the surviving
spouse annually or at more frequent intervals. ° Moreover, the sur-
viving spouse must have the power to appoint the entire interest or
a specific portion thereof to either herself or to her estate;" this
power must be exercisable by her alone, either during life or by
will, and in all events."
An analysis of the decided cases reveals that with respect to the
income requirements, the statutory phrase "entitled for life to all
the income from the entire interest, or all the income from a specific
portion thereof"'3 has proved the most troublesome to apply.
The statutory phrase "alone and in all events"'4 governing the power
of appointment has been even more cumbersome. It is the purpose
here to explore those phrases in depth.
Both the life estate and the power of appointment are creatures
of state law. It follows, then, that any determination regarding the
nature of the interest passing from the decedent to his spouse will
depend upon applicable local law.'5 The United States Supreme
Court has phrased the proposition in this way: "State law creates
legal interests and rights. The federal revenue acts designate what
if it is to be acquired for the spouse pursuant to directions of the decedent by his exec-
utor or by the trustee of a trust. CODE § 2056(b) (1) (C).
8 CODE § 2056(b) (5).
9Treas. Reg. S 20.2056(b)-5(a) (1) (1958) [hereinafter cited as Reg. §J.
'OReg. § 20.2056(b)-5(a) (2) (1958).
"1Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(a) (3) (1958).
'
2Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(a) (4) (1958).
13 CODE 5 2056(b) (5).
14 Ibid.
15Reg. 5 20.2056(b)-5(e) (1958) asserts that regard must be had to the pro-
visions of the law of the jurisdiction under which the interest passes in determining
whether the conditions set forth in Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5 (a) (1958) are satisfied by
the instrument of transfer.
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interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed."'" A number of cases
have applied this principle without question."
I. NATURE OF THE PROPERTY INTEREST PASSING TO
SURVIVING SPOUSE
A. Survivor Vested With a Life Estate
Section 2056(b) (5) requires that the surviving spouse be en-
titled to the income of the trust or property "for life." If a trust is
involved, it is immaterial that the wife may terminate the trust
either by demanding corpus or by exercise of her power of appoint-
ment.18 It is important that no other person will have this power."
The words "for life" have upset the estate planning of at least one
testator. In Starrett v. Commissioner," it was provided by will that
the wife should have the power at any time to demand payments of
either the income or corpus of a trust left for her, except in the event
of her incapacity or the appointment of a guardian, conservator, or
other custodian. Should this occur, the rights of the wife were to
cease. The petitioner contended that if a guardian were to be ap-
16 Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1939).
1 7 Estate of Peyton v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1963); Piatt v. Gray,
321 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1963); Hoffman v. McGinnes, 277 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1960);
Commissioner v. Estate of Ellis, 252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958); Northwest Security
Nat'l Bank v. Welsh, 203 F. Supp. 263 (D.S.D.), appeal dismissed, 308 F.2d 367
(8th Cir. 1962); Markoff v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 805 (D.R.I. 1960); Boyd v.
Gray, 162 F. Supp. 307 (W.D. Ky. 1957), vacated on other grounds, 261 F.2d 914
(6th Cir. 1958); Estate of Elwood Comer, 31 T.C. 1193 (1959); Estate of William C.
Allen, 29 T.C. 465 (1957). One effect of the rule has been to contribute another in-
teresting aspect to the practice of law. Suppose an attorney anticipates that the Com-
missioner may disallow the marital deduction on the ground that the will places too
many restrictions on the rights of the surviving spouse. The attorney is cognizant that
judgments of a state court are binding on a federal court in proceedings relating to
estate taxes if the decision was rendered in an adversary proceeding and there is no
adequate proof of fraud or collusion. Northwest Security Nat'l Bank v. Welsh, supra,
Gordon v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 542 (W.D. Mo. 1958). In light of this rule,
counsel might deem it advantageous to quickly file in probate court hopefully to obtain
a favorable construction of the will. Estate of Peyton v. Commissioner, supra at 441-42.
For example, in Estate of Sweet v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 401 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 878 (1956), the attorney for the estate filed such a suit. The surviv-
ing spouse and children were named as defendants in the proceedings; neither filed an
answer. The decision came down the same day couched in the very language of the at-
torney's petition. The decision was reversed on the ground that the proceedings were
collusive and essentially of a nonadversary nature. Contra, Northwest Security Nat'l
Bank v. Welsh, supra, involving an inconsistency in a will where, on essentially the
same facts, the court upheld a similar decision because it felt that the court below based
its judgment solely on a matter of law.
18Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5 (f) (6) (1958).
10 Reg. 5 20.2056(b)-5 (f) (7) (1958).
20 223 F.2d 163 (1st Cit. 1955).
1966]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
pointed, the laws of Rhode Island were such that the guardian could
not have exercised the wife's rights in the trust. Thus, they would
cease in any event. The Commissioner argued to the contrary; the
court made no decision on the matter. Instead, the court pointed
out that the husband's will had provided for the complete cessation
of the power whereas, if Rhode Island law did apply in the manner
petitioner indicated, the application would result only in a suspen-
sion of the power. Thus, the marital deduction was denied because
the interest could fail upon the occurrence of a particular event or
contingency - the surviving spouse was not "entitled for life."21
It is inconsequential that the wife is in no position to demand or
receive payments during a period beginning with the date of her
husband's death through the date of final distribution.2 Such
period becomes significant when it appears that the executor is di-
rected to delay final distribution beyond the time normally required
for such procedure.2"
B. All of the Income
The statute requires that the surviving spouse be entitled "for
life to all of the income."24  If under state law the spouse has
been given the right to income for life with a qualifying power of
appointment, the estate tax regulations could present a plethora
of problems. If a trust is involved, its primary purpose must not be
the accumulation of income.25 No individual other than the surviv-
ing spouse may be given the discretion to accumulate income ' un-
less the surviving spouse is given the right either annually or more
frequently to demand distribution of what would otherwise be ac-
cumulated.27 Consent of another can never be a condition prece-
dent to the distribution of income." A fortiori, no third party
may have the power to change the terms of the trust so as to deprive
the wife of her right to income.29 Furthermore, it appears that the
2 1 CODE § 2056(b) (5).
22 Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(e) (1958).
23 Ibid. See Davis, Effect of a Time Delay Clause on the Marital Deduction Where
Periodic Payments Must Qualify Under Section 2056(b)(5) or Section 2056(b)[6), 51
ILL. B.J. 752 (1963).
2 4 CODE § 2056(b) (5). (Emphasis added.)
25Reg. § 20.2056(b) -5 (f) (5) (1958).
26 Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f) (7) (1958).
27Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f) (5) (1958).




statutory phrase "entitled ...to all of the income""m means that
there must be a real possibility that income reasonably consistent
with the dollar size of the trust corpus will be produced. A bequest
of property not likely to produce income with no power vested in
the wife to change the nature of the corpus will not satisfy the
statute 3'
On the other hand, "income" does not require cash payments,
nor does it require gross receipts.3" A life interest in real estate
consisting of the wife's use and occupancy of a dwelling is ap-
parendy the equivalent of "entitled . . . to all the income."33
When computing net income and allocating receipts and expenses
between income and principal beneficiaries, the trustee need only
remember that the statute requires that the survivor have the sub-
stantial enjoyment of income during life." The power in the trus-
tee to allocate will not of itself disqualify the interest, 5 nor will
reasonable administrative powers vested in the trustee.3"
A recent pronouncement of the Internal Revenue Service may
facilitate estate planning in this area. Under Revenue Ruling
66-39," an interest passing in trust may qualify for the marital
deduction, notwithstanding provisions granting trustees the power
to allocate or apportion receipts and disbursements between income
and corpus if under local law applicable to the administration of the
trust, reasonable limitations are placed upon the exercise of the pow-
ers.3 8 Instrumental in gaining the ruling was the fact that state law
obligated the trustees to apply reasonable accounting principles and
to invest corpus at reasonable intervals and as reasonable men; in
addition, the trustees could be held accountable if they unreasonably
retained assets.'
This liberal ruling is to be compared with the recent Ohio case
of Sherman v. Sherman.' In Sherman the trustees were given the
30 CODB 2056(b) (5).
SlReg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f) (5) (1958).
32Reg. §§ 20.2056(b)-5(f) (3), (4) (1958).
3 3 CODE § 2056(b) (5); Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f) (4) (1958); Thomas v. United
States, 317 F.2d 519 (6th Cir. 1963), affirming per curiam 207 F. Supp. 609 (N.D.
Ohio 1962).
34 Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(3) (1958).
35 Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(4) (1958).
36 Ibid.
37 1966 INT. REv. BULL. No. 8, at 48.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 5 Ohio St. 2d 27, 213 N.X.2d 360 (1966).
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power "to determine in their discretion how all receipts and dis-
bursements shall be credited, charged, or apportioned between in-
come and principal .. ". ."" It was held that stock dividends and
capital gains could be allocated to income as long as there was no
bad faith, abuse of discretion, or action inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the trust.42
In light of these state law standards, the troublesome language
is as follows: "[Ulnder the power to allocate, the trustees may, in
their discretion, withhold receipts from income and build corpus,
thus preventing a lowering in value of the assets.... If corpus were
invaded the trustees could then replenish it through an allocation
to corpus."4
The question becomes whether such a trust, when read in con-
junction with Revenue Ruling 66-39, evidences an "intention to
deprive the surviving spouse of the beneficial enjoyment required
by the statute."44  If such an intention is found, then the marital
deduction will be denied because the surviving spouse would not be
entitled to all of the income. Otherwise, such a trust would pass
muster as being one for which "the local courts will impose reason-
able limitations upon the exercise of the powers."45 The permissive
language of the opinion favors the former interpretation; yet the an-
swer may well lie with the use of the word "all" in the clause which
was at issue in Sherman. At another point in the opinion, the court
alluded to the time-honored axiom that the intent of the testator
must govern46 and then asserted:
Appellant argues that the intent was to give discretion only in
cases of bona fide doubt as to the nature of the..item to be allo-
cated. So to hold would do violence to the language of . . . [the
quoted clause] which uses the term, "all." If the testator had not
intended that the trustees should have discretion as to all receipts
and disbursements he certainly would not have used the word,
"all.,,47
Until clarification is had either from the Internal Revenue Ser-
41 Id. at 29, 213 N.E.2d at 363. (All italicized in original.)
42 Id. at 27, 213 N.E.2d at 360.
43 d. at 35-36, 213 N.E.2d at 366. (Emphasis added.)
44 Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f) (4) (1958).
45 Reg. § 20.2056(b) -5 (f) (4) (1958).
46 Sherman v. Sherman, 5 Ohio St. 2d 27, 32, 213 N.E.2d 360, 364 (1966).
47 Id. at 35, 213 N.E.2d at 366.
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vice or from the Ohio Supreme Court, only one solution recom-
mends itself: cautious drafting. 8
In many instances the decedent was primarily concerned with
preventing his surviving spouse from having control over the even-
tual disposition of his property. Apparently the deceased husband
has been quite willing to give his spouse all the income from the
entire interest or the specific portion.49 This is not always the case.
In Estate of Allen L. Weisberger," the wife was entitled to all the
income in two trusts subject to maintenance and support payments
to her son. The trustee was to have uncontrolled discretion as to
when such payments were to be made. He was to take into consid-
eration the amount of other income the son was receiving. The son
was beneficiary of two additional trusts, one producing 18,000 dol-
lars per year while the other netted 31,000 dollars annually. The
circumstances made it appear that there was no possibility of the
son's receiving income from either of his mother's trusts. Never-
theless, the contingency was not too remote for this court. The
possibility that the wife might be deprived of some income meant
that she was not entitled to all the income.51
In Thomas v. United States," the surviving spouse was given
the right to use and occupy the family residence for the duration of
her life. Under certain circumstances the residence could be sold
by the trustee, who was given discretion to apply the proceeds for
the maintenance and education of the testator's sons. Since the
right of the widow to use the residence could be terminated, she was
not entitled to all of the income, and therefore the estate was de-
nied the marital deduction."s
C. A Specific Portion of the Interest
Section 2056(b) (5) further provides that the surviving spouse
may be "entitled for life to all the income ... from a specific por-
tion thereof."54  The problem has been to determine what con-
4 8 See generally Casner, A Fiduciary's Powers and the Marital Deduction, 100
TRUSTS AND ESTATES 247 (1961).
4 9 Note, The Creation of a Power of Appointment Marital Deduction Trust, 33
MIss L.J. 232 (1962). Contra, Estate of Peyton v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 438, 446
(8th Cir. 1963).
5029 T.C. 217 (1957).
51 Id. at 223.
52 317 F.2d 519 (6th Cir. 1963).
53 Id. at 521.
5 4 CoE § 2056(b) (5). (Emphasis added.)
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stitutes a "specific portion." The estate tax regulations speak of a
fractional or percentile share of a property interest which over a
period of time will reflect "its proportionate share of the increment
or decline in the whole of the property interest to which the income
rights and the power relate."55 Thus, it appears that the Service de-
sires the surviving spouse and the government to share equally the
risk of change in value of the entire bequest. 6 If at the time of the
husband's death, the bequest to the wife was in the ratio of one to
two to the entire corpus, it must appear that at the time of the wife's
demise, the ratio will remain the same. 7 For this reason a bequest
of a life interest with qualifying power of appointment over a
named dollar amount, for example, 100,000 dollars where the cor-
pus is 200,000 dollars, will not merit the deduction because the
denominator of the resulting fraction is free to vary with the eco-
nomic circumstances. 8 Consequently, the regulations say that "if
the annual income of the spouse is limited to a specific sum, or if
she has a power to appoint only a specific sum out of a larger fund,
the interest is not a deductible interest."5
In Gelb v. Commissioner," the regulations mentioned above
were disapproved. The wife was the income beneficiary of a trust
established by her husband the trustees of which were given discre-
tion to pay a minor daughter up to 5,000 dollars per year for educa-
tion, support, and maintenance. It could be determined actuarially
how much of the corpus would be diverted to the minor daughter
during the joint lives of both mother and daughter. This figure
was subtracted from total corpus; the wife had the right to all the
income from the remainder plus a power of appointment coexten-
sive with it. Thus, her counsel alleged that the resulting named
dollar amount satisfied the "specific portion" language of section
2056(b) (5)."' The Commissioner countered, stressing the "frac-
tional or percentile language" found in the regulations, and denied
the deduction. The court, speaking through Judge Friendly, re-
solved the matter in favor of the taxpayer by force of the following
logic: "That Congress gave a fractional interest as an example of a
,specific portion' does not warrant a construction that Congress did
55Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(c) (1958).
56 Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1962).
57 Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(c) (1958).
58Ibid. Comment, 16 VAND. L. REv. 261, 265 (1962).
59 Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(c) (1958).
60 298 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1962).
61CODE § 2056(b) (5).
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not mean to include other instances fairly within the language and
the underlying policy."62 To that extent, at least, the regulations met
the court's disapproval.
Whether Gelb will be of assistance to the estate planner must re-
main in doubt. The court relied heavily upon actuarial computa-
tion although the mechanics of the calculation are mentioned only
twice in the opinion. 3 An extensive footnote was appended to the
court's decision stressing that the use of actuarial computation has
long been sanctioned by the Commissioner.64 In this connection it
now appears that Gelb will be limited to its facts, that is, a situation
in which the will designates a fixed maximum which may be di-
verted to another. This is illustrated by Flesher v. United States6
where the wife's interest in income and corpus was also subject to
the support needs of a minor child. Unlike the will in Gelb, no
specific amount was designated as a maximum which could be ap-
plied for the child's benefit. Since there was no way to make the
child's needs certain, the actuarial computation could not be em-
ployed. As a result, there was no deduction as to any "specific
portion."
II. THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT
The statute66 declares that the power of appointment shall re-
side "in the surviving spouse... with no power in any other person
to appoint."6 This power must be "exercisable by such spouse alone
and in all events" and must be coextensive with and sufficient
to "appoint the entire interest, or . . . [a] specific portion"6 free
of any trust or joint tenancy so as to constitute the appointee an
unqualified owner of the subject property.69 If the surviving spouse
is not given a sufficient power exercisable during life, the statute
prescribes that there must be a power exercisable "in favor of...
the estate of the surviving spouse."7  At least one case has held
62 Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544, 551 (2d Cit. 1962).
631d. at 549, 551.
64Id. at 551 n.7.
65 238 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. W.Va. 1965).
66 CODE 5 2056(b) (5).
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Reg. 5 20.2056(b)-5 (g) (2) (1958).
70 Code 5 2056(b) (5).
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that such a power must be sufficient to render the subject property
liable for the debts of the surviving spouse upon her demise.7
If the power is exercisable only during life, the surviving spouse
must be able to appoint the property to herself.72 A limited power
of appointment or withdrawal may be given the surviving spouse
exercisable during life provided that she has a sufficient testamen-
tary power.7"
While the wife's right to income may await the final distribu-
tion of the estate,74 the power of appointment should exist immedi-
ately after the death of the decedent.75 If the power cannot be
effectively exercised until final distribution, it is not exercisable "in
all events."7 6  The statute is satisfied, however, if the power may be
exercised immediately following the death of the testator, even
though the appointee must await final distribution before coming
into possession and enjoyment of the property.77
As a matter of historical interest, Trachtman makes the
following statement: "A trust with a general power of appoint-
ment in the surviving spouse may qualify for the marital de-
duction if, and only if, it meets the special conditions laid
down in 2056(b) (5) and Regulations § 20.2056(b)-5."78 It
once appeared that if the surviving spouse were given a gen-
eral power of appointment which would result in the prop-
erty's inclusion in her gross estate under section 2041, the property
would qualify for the marital deduction.79 It was the following
language in the Senate Committee Report which gave that indica-
tion: "This provision is designed to allow the marital deduction for
such cases where the value of the property over which the surviving
spouse has a power of appointment will (if not consumed) be sub-
ject to either the estate tax or the gift tax in the case of such surviv-
71 Estate of William C. Allen, 29 T.C. 465 (1957).
7 2 Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(g) (1) (1958).
7 3 Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5 (g) (5) (1958).
7 4 Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f) (9) (1958).
7 5 Reg. § 20.2056(b) -5 (g) (4) (1958).
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
7 8 TRAcHTMAN, ESTATE PLANNING 119 (1964).
79 Estate of Pipe v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 210, 214 (2d Cir. 1957) (dissenting
opinion); Estate of Harry A. Ellis, 26 T.C. 694 (1956), rev'd, 252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.
1958); Ward, The Right to Invade Corpus of a Marital Deduction Trust - lWhat is an
Unqualified Right?, N.Y.U. 18TH INST. ON FED. TAX 1205, 1208 (1960); Note, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 504 (1964); Note, 46 KY. L.J. 586, 591-93 (1958).
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ing spouse."8  Only one decision, Estate of Harry A. Ellis,81 which
was later reversed by the Third Circuit, has taken that language at
face value. There, the Tax Court equated the power required by sec-
tion 2056(b) (5) to the power rendering the property taxable un-
der section 2041 and declared that "it was the intent of Congress to
permit the deduction sought in just such cases as the one before us.
The language of the applicable statute is consistent with such in-
tent.'; 82  Neither the Tax Court nor any other court has since
taken this position.' Judicial sentiment on the matter seems well
described by the following language of Judge Tuttle in May v. Corn-
missioner:' "We know of no rule of construction that permits the
court to resort to legislative history or to other sections not neces-
sarily correlated with the one under scrutiny to determine the mean-
ing of language which is as clear as is that of Section . . .
[2056(b) (5)]. "85 Today the well-settled rule is that the power
must be "unlimited."8 6  Thus, the great bulk of the decided cases
have involved the phrase "alone and in all events."87  In this con-
nection it will be seen that the statutory phrase "no power in any
other person to appoint"'' is the logical converse of "alone and
in all events."89 Litigation involving one phrase necessarily involves
the other.
A. Exercisable by Surviving Spouse Alone
When it is found that a power is not exercisable "alone," there
is generally a power in the trustee or trustees to determine the ulti-
mate disposition of corpus or to withhold corpus from the surviving
spouse. For example, in Dexter v. United States0 the testator au-
thorized his trustees "to make from time to time from the principal
of said trust fund such payments to or for the benefit of my wife...
80S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1958); 1948-1 CuM. BULL. 331,
342.
8126 T.C. 694 (1956), rev'd, 252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958).
82 Id. at 699.
83 See Ward, supra note 79.
84 283 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1960).
85 May v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 853, 855 (2d Cir. 1960).
8 6 Ward, supra note 79, at 1208.
87 COD] § 2056(b) (5).
88 Ibid.
89Ibid. Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544, 547 (2d Cir. 1962).
90 163 F. Supp. 442 (D. Mass. 1958).
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as she may request in writing."'" The will went on to caution the
trustees that "it is my chief wish to protect my wife against privation
rather than to maintain a maximum fund for final distribution."
92
The court found that "to protect my wife against privation" implied
that the trustees had a discretion to refuse a payment which the wife
might earnestly desire. Thus there was no power exercisable by
the wife "alone and in all events."9 " Similarly, in Estate of Spero,94
where joint trustees, one of whom was the surviving spouse, were
given a discretion to apply corpus to meet the "reasonable needs"
of such surviving spouse or any of the testator's children, the court
held that the surviving spouse had no power exercisable alone be-
cause she did not have an unlimited power to appropriate the prop-
erty of the trust "as if she were the virtual owner thereof."9 5  The
same objectionable characteristics resulted in a denial of the marital
deduction in Estate of Wheeler,9" wherein it was provided that there
may be paid "to or for the benefit of... [his] wife or... children
[such amounts of corpus] as the trustee in its absolute discretion
may deem necessary or proper. . . ."" The surviving spouse was
given power to take monies from corpus from time to time but she
was never to take more than one half of its then-existing balance.
The court denied the deduction since the power in the trustee con-
stituted a power "in any other person to appoint."9"
B. Power Exercisable in All Events
The statute requires that the power be exercisable "in all
events."99  That is, the exercise of the power must be "unlimited"
as to time and surrounding circumstances.' 0 It is axiomatic that no
particular words are required for the creation of a power of appoint-
ment and that under state law certain related powers may be equiva-
91 Id. at 444.
92 Ibid.
93 CODE § 2056(b) (5).
9434 T.C. 1116 (1960).
95 Ibid.
96 26 T.C. 466 (1956).
97 Id. at 467-68.
98 Ibid. See also Rev. Rul. 395, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 458.
9 9 Code § 2056(b) (5).
100 Ward, supra note 79, at 1208. Compare Starrett v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d




lent to a power of appointment, for example, the power to invade
corpus, the power to use and consume, and possibly the power to sell
and convey.' 0 ' The usual case involves one of the related powers
where remainders over are provided. As will be seen, the power is
not exercisable in all events if applicable state law protects the in-
terest of the remainderman by requiring the surviving spouse to ex-
ercise the power in good faith, thus preventing a gift of the subject
property or preventing an amount unconsumed at the death of the
surviving spouse from passing under her will.'
The baseline case is Estate of May v. Commissioner °3 which
affirmed dictum found in the earlier case of Estate of Pipe v. Com-
missioner.'"" In May the surviving spouse was given a life interest
in the residue of her husband's estate with "the right in the sole dis-
cretion of my said wife to invade and use the principal not only
for necessities but generally for her comfort, happiness and well-
being."' 5  In this situation the law of New York was dear. Even
given the broad power found in the will, the wife was still required
by New York case law to use good faith when exercising it. Thus,
her power was not exercisable in all events.
The holding of May and the impact of state law in this area,
drawn into the picture by the existence of remainder interests, can
best be understood by comparing Ellis °. with Hoffman.' Both
cases were handed down by the Third Circuit, both involved Penn-
sylvania law, both involved broad powers given the surviving
spouse, and both contained remainder interests. In the Ellis case
the bequest was worded: "[TIhere [shall be] paid to my wife not
101 Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 504 (1964); Note, 33 MIss. LJ. 232 (1962).
102 Esterces, Lifetime Power of Appointment May Pail To Qualify for Marital De-
duction, 21 J. TAXATION 162 (1964). This does not mean that the surviving spouse
must have a testamentary power of appointment. Piatt v. Gray, 321 F.2d 79 (6th Cir.
1963). Contra, see articles cited in Note, Powers To Consume and the Marital Deduc-
tion, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 504, 510 n.39 (1964).
103 283 F2d 853 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 903 (1961).
104241 F.2d 210 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 355 U.S. 814 (1957). The Second
Circuit held that the surviving spouse was given a legal life estate and not a fee simple
interest. Since a legal life estate could not qualify under the 1948 amendment which
required that a life interest be held in trust, the deduction was denied. The court went
on to assume that a legal life estate would qualify and then answered the precise ques-
tion subsequently presented in May.
105 Estate of May v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 853, 854 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 903 (1961).
106 Commissioner v. Estate of Ellis, 252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958).
107 Hoffman v. McGinnes, 277 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1960).
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less than Five Thousand Dollars .... [Slhe, and she alone, shall
be the judge of how much shall be required and the same shall be
paid."' °  In Hoffman, on the other hand, the bequest stipulated
that the trustees should pay to the surviving spouse "any part of the
principal of my estate she may desire and said trust shall cease as
to that part of the principal so paid to her. It is my intention that
my said wife .. .shall have the whole income .. .and spend any
part or all of the principal that she may desire during her life-
time."1 9  The difference in connotation between require and desire
evoked the rule of an 1899 Pennsylvania case." ° Estate of Tyson"'
held that the intention of the testator should be examined to deter-
mine if it was his desire that the property be preserved for the re-
mainderman. If such an intent were found, then an attempt by the
holder of the life interest to change the beneficiaries would work a
fraud on the testator." 2 In Ellis the court interpreted the word "re-
quire" in this fashion while in Hoffman the court found that "de-
sire" empowered the life beneficiary to defeat the remainder inter-
est. Thus, in Ellis the surviving spouse could invade corpus only
if she acted in good faith; therefore, she was not vested with a power
exercisable in all events. The Hoffman bequest imposed no simi-
lar restriction upon the surviving spouse, and hence the statute was
satisfied."'
A comparison of the two cases reveals why the life beneficiary
must not be prevented from making a gift of the subject property or
from passing the property under her own will.
Several courts have paid particular attention to the wife's ability
to make a gift of the subject property. In Geyer v. Bookwalter,"4
the surviving spouse was given the "home place" for life with "good
and full right to sell and convey fee simple title thereto... and not
account for the proceeds thereof.""'  The interest qualified for the
108 Commissioner v. Estate of Ellis, 252 F.2d 109, 110 (3d Cir. 1958).
109 Hoffman v. McGinnes, 277 F.2d 598, 600 (3d Cir. 1960).
110 Estate of Tyson, 191 Pa. 218, 43 Adl. 131 (1899).
III Ibid.
112 Compare Collings v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Ky. 1961), with
Boyd v. Gray, 162 F. Supp. 307 (W.D. Ky. 1957). See United States v. Spicer, 332
F.2d 750 (10th Cir. 1964); Piatt v. Gray, 321 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1963); United States
v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 297 F.2d 891 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 887
(1962); Estate of Tarver v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1958).
113 See also Robertson v. United States, 310 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1962).
114 193 F. Supp. 57 (W.D. Mo. 1961).
115 Id. at 59.
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marital deduction because the court found that the wife could make
a gift of the property by passing it for nominal consideration with-
out having to account for the same. Thus, she had an absolute
power of disposal in all events. In Betts v. United States,"6 where
the wife was given rents and profits for life from certain property
with the power "in her sole discretion, to use such part of the prin-
cipal of my said estate as she shall desire for her support, main-
tenance and enjoyment,""' 7 the good faith standard applied to
protect the remaindermen. Thus, the court said that the wife had
"no power to dispose of any portion not consumed, by gift or ap-
pointment to herself or others, by instrument inter vivos or will,
disposition of any portion not so consumed being governed by tes-
tator's will."'" 8
In Ohio, relations between the life tenant and the remainder-
man are governed by Johnson v. Johnson."9 Like the Hoffman and
Ellis cases discussed above, Johnson involved a broadly worded
power to use and consume. In Johnson, the testator devised all of
his property to his wife "with full power to bargain, sell, convey,
exchange or dispose of the same as she may think proper, but, if at
the time of her decease, any of my said property shall remain un-
consumed, my will is that the same be equally divided between my
brothers and sisters ... ."12' The Supreme Court of Ohio rejected
the petitioner's contention that the surviving spouse took a fee sim-
ple interest and held her to be merely a life tenant. The court went
on to establish new law in Ohio by ruling that the surviving
spouse held the property as a quasi-trustee for those in remainder.
Thus, a duty rested upon the surviving spouse "in the nature of a
trust, to have due regard for the rights of those in remainder ....,11
While she could use and consume the entire estate if that became
necessary for. her support, "she could not go beyond what would
be regarded as good faith toward the remaindermen."' 2 The in-
tentions of the testator were found to be consistent with the restric-
116 239 F. Supp. 444 (N.D.N.Y. 1965).
17 Id. at 445.
118 Id. at 446. This portion of the opinion was quoted from United States v. Lin-
coin Rochester Trust Co., 297 F.2d 891, 893 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 887
(1962). See also United States v. First Nat'l Trust & Say. Bank, 335 F.2d 107 (9th
Cir. 1964); Estate of Sommes v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1961).
19 51 Ohio St. 446, 38 N.E. 61 (1894).
120 Id. at 448, 38 N.E. at 61-62.
121 Id. at 460-61, 38 N.E. at 64.
122 Id. at 461, 38 N.E. at 64. (Emphasis added.)
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tions incident to the life tenant's status as quasi-trustee. Thus, the
surviving spouse had no authority "to recklessly squander or give
away ... the estate.' 1
23
The landmark decision of Johnson v. Johnson24 is deeply en-
grained in Ohio jurisprudence.'25 Furthermore, it is well settled
that an ambiguous devise with an accompanying power and limita-
tion over creates a life estate in the first taker.'26 In order to pre-
clude the danger of having the surviving spouse declared a quasi-
trustee, the following type of devise is suggested:
I authorize and direct my trustees to pay over all of the trust prin-
cipal and thus to terminate the trust, or to pay over any part of the
principal from time to time, to my wife or to any other persons or
appointees, as my wife may direct by an instrument signed and
acknowledged by her and delivered to my Trustees .... The power
herein given to my wife shall be exercisable by her alone, at any
time and in all events, and shall be subject to no restrictions or
limitations.27
Although this devise has been labelled "giving up the ghost' 21 to
the powers that be, it is at least a clear solution in an otherwise
murky area. The clause is unquestionably effective in Ohio to cre-
1231d. at 462, 38 N.E. at 65.
12451 Ohio St. 446, 38 N.E. 61 (1894).
125 See Tax Comm'n v. Oswald, 109 Ohio St. 36, 141 N.E. 678 (1923); Windnagel
v. Windnagel, 104 Ohio App. 23, 146 N.E.2d 457 (1957) (testator cannot convey
property to some of the remaindermen for a nominal consideration and omit others);
Gould v. Porter, 103 Ohio App. 156, 144 N.E.2d 555 (1956) (co-remainderman en-
titled to partition of property conveyed by quasi-trustee life tenant to another remainder-
man without adequate consideration); Rippel v. Rippel, 82 N.E.2d 140 (Ohio Ct. App.
1948), appeal dis-missed, 154 Ohio St. 83, 93 N.E.2d 285 (1950) (if quasi-trustee life
tenant sells property subject to the trust, he holds the proceeds as trustee for the benefit
of himself and the remainderman); Wilson v. Wilson, 21 Ohio L. Abs. 137 (Ct. App.
1953); Smaltz v. Prindle, 15 Ohio L. Abs. 145 (Ct. App. 1933); Hobson v. Lower, 10
Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 323 (Cir. Ct. 1907); Moore v. Idler, 6 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 19 (Cir.
Ct. 1904); In re Graham's Estate, 98 N.E.2d 104 (Ohio P. Ct. 1950) (proceeds from
sale held in trust for remainderman); Io re Barnes' Estate, 108 N.E.2d 88 (Ohio C.P.
1950), af'd, 108 N.E.2d 101 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952); Allen v. Globe Ins. Co., 10 Ohio
Dec. Reprint 204 (Super. Cc. 1888), aff'd, 52 Ohio St. 622, 44 N.E. 1129 (1894).
Cf. OHIO REV, CODE § 2113.58, which section affords protection of the remainder-
man's interest in personal property. It has been held under this section that the Probate
Court may require the life tenant holding personal property to post bond at any time
prior to the termination of the life estate. In re Estate of Kyle, 106 Ohio App. 502,
155 N.E.2d 498 (1958). Furthermore, the Probate Court has discretion to refuse dis-
tribution to the life tenant and may direct distribution to a trustee who would then
distribute the income from the property to the life tenant. In re Estate of Miller, 160
Ohio St. 529, 117 N.E.2d 598 (1954).
126See, e.g., Tax Comm'n v. Oswald, 109 Ohio St. 36, 141 N.E. 678 (1923);
Johnson v. Johnson, 51 Ohio St. 441, 38 N.E. 61 (1894); Baxter v. Bowyer, 19 Ohio
St. 490 (1866).




ate a general and unlimited power of appointment as required by
section 2056(b) (5).129
When any unconsumed portion must pass under the will of the
first spouse to die - because the surviving spouse's power to invade
or consume is limited by the standard of good faith - the interest
passing to the surviving spouse is terminable. 3 ' That is, the inter-
est will pass from the decedent to one other than the surviving
spouse, and after the estate in such surviving spouse has ended, the
interest may ripen into possession or enjoyment. The case of Com-
missioner v. Estate of Ellis3. serves as a suitable example. It will
be recalled that the law of Pennsylvania was such that the power
in the surviving spouse was not sufficient to gain the benefits of the
statute.'32 Elsewhere in the testator's will it was said that "I give
... one-half the principal, absolutely, unto the estate of my beloved
wife ... and the other half unto my dear children."' 3 The
case held that one half of the corpus was deductible; one half was
nondeductible because it was terminable. Since one half passed to
the estate of the surviving spouse, no third party would share pos-
session and enjoyment of an interest passing from the first spouse
to die. This, of course, was not true of the amount of corpus pass-
ing to "my dear children."'3 4
The disposition in Ellis suggests an estate planning technique
which may well be more advantageous than the "power of appoint-
ment" trust which has been the subject of this Note. It would seem
129 See OHIo REv. CODE § 1339.15, which reads in part as follows: "'[P]ower of
appointment' means any power which is in effect a power to appoint, however created,
regardless of the nomenclature used in creating the power and regardless of connota-
tions under the law of property, trusts, or wills. Such power includes but is not limited
to powers which are special, general, limited, absolute." See First-Central Trust Co.
v. Claflin, 73 N.E.2d 388 (Ohio C.P. 1947), in which the court held that a trust in-
denture which provided that on the death of the life beneficiary the property shall be
paid over to such persons or corporations as the life tenant specified in his will created
a general testamentary power of appointment. See also Cleveland Trust Co. v. Mc-
Quade, 133 N.E.2d 664, 670 (Ohio P. Ct. 1955); 43 OHIo JuR. 2D Powers § 5
(1960).
13 0 Peyton's Estate v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1963); Allen v. United
States, 242 F. Supp. 687 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); Stedman v. United States, 233 F. Supp.
569 (D. Mass. 1964); Estate of Elwood Comer, 31 T.C. 1193 (1959); Estate of Wal-
lace S. Howell, 28 T.C. 1193 (1957); Estate of Harriet C. Evilsizer, 27 T.C. 710
(1957); Estate of Harrison P. Shedd, 23 T.C. 41 (1954), affd, 237 F.2d 345 (9th Cit.
1956); Estate of Michael Melamid, 22 T.C. 966 (1954).
131252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958).
13 2 Esterces, supra note 102. See text accompanying notes 110-13 supra.
133 Commissioner v. Estate of Ellis, 252 F.2d 109, 110-11 (3d Cir. 1958).
1341d. at I1I.
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that as long as income is paid either to the spouse or to her estate,
the trustee of an "estate trust" could be vested with vast discretion-
ary powers.'35 Furthermore, since the interest passing to the sur-
viving spouse is not terminable, non-productive property could
form the corpus of the trust,"' and the trustee could freely accumu-
late income throughout the life of the surviving spouse.' More-
over, since the estate planner is interested not only in saving death
taxes for the estate of the first spouse to die but also for the estate
of the surviving spouse, the "estate trust" rather than the "power
of appointment" trust seems the tool for the task. By giving the
surviving spouse an income interest for life with a remainder to
her estate, the surviving spouse by her will could create life estates
coupled with special powers in the takers thereunder, and thus fed-
eral estate tax would not be payable upon their demise. 3 Any
attempt to do so under a "power of appointment" trust would run
afoul of section 2041 (a) (3) which proscribes the exercise of a
"power of appointment created after October 21, 1942, by creating
another power of appointment which under the applicable local law
can be validly exercised so as to postpone the vesting of any es-
tate . . .. 139
However, the compelling advantages of the "power of appoint-
ment" trust probably account for its more frequent use. The "pow-
er of appointment" trust affords greater protection against the
creditors of the surviving spouse in the event that she failed to exer-
cise the power. 4 ' Furthermore, since appointive property is not
considered to be "an inheritable estate" for purposes of dower and
curtesy, nor property of the donee for purposes of the surviving
spouse's forced share, appointive property is insulated against the
subsequent remarriage of the surviving spouse. 4' If the first spouse
to die, in creating the power, expressly so stipulates, the property
subject to the power may be distributed directly to the appointees,
thereby saving probate and administration expenses.'42 Perhaps of
greater importance is the fact that the first to die can retain under




139 CODE § 2041 (a) (3).
140 SCHWARTZ, op. cit. supra note 135.
141 Ibid. See also RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 332(2) (1940).
142 SCHWARTZ, op. cit. supra note 135.
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a "power of appointment" trust greater control over the ultimate
disposition of the property by use of default of appointment provi-
sions coupled with formal restrictions on the power's exercise or
with the requirement that the power be exercised by will.14 By
limiting a remainder to the estate of the surviving spouse, all of
these vital controls are forfeited.
Moreover, there is a real question as to whether a remainder
may be validly limited to an estate.' 4 In cases holding against such
a bequest or devise, it is generally decreed that the term "estate" is
too uncertain to be given testamentary effect," 5 or that an estate is
not a person or legal entity capable of taking property, so that partial
intestacy results.'
Where the remainder to the estate fails, the interest passing to
the surviving spouse at once becomes terminable so that the marital
deduction is lost.4 '
A California decision, In re Brunet's Estate,'48 may form the
basis for validating devises to the estate of the surviving spouse.
Justice Traynor, writing for the court, asserted that the provisions
of a will should, if possible, be construed to give their intended ef-
fect and to avoid intestacy. In this light, he held that when the
word "estate" was used with reference to a deceased person, it was
evident that the testator intended that the takers under the will of
such named deceased should benefit, and thus the devise was suffi-
ciently certain to be given effect. 4 ' Unfortunately, it will be diffi-
cult for the estate planner to rely upon In re Brunet's Estate.' The
case involved a holographic will written by a layman. An integral
part of Justice Traynor's construction of the will was a California
statute'.' which provided that "technical words in a will are to be
143 Ibid.
144 TRACffrMAN, ESrATE PLANNING 120 (1964). There is a paucity of cases
in this area. Some of them are collected in Casner, Comment: Estate Planning Under
the Revenue Act of 1948 - The Regulations, 63 HAv. L REv. 99, 102 (1949). For
a discussion of a bequest or devise to one's estate or, in the alternative, to one or his
estate, see Annot., 69 A.L.R. 1243 (1930). See also I re Brunet's Estate, 34 Cal. 2d
105, 109, 207 P.2d 567, 569 (1949).
145 1 re Glass' Estate, 164 Cal. 765, 130 Pac. 868 (1913). Cf. Nelson v. Minton,
46 Ohio App. 39, 187 N.E. 576 (1933).
146 Gardner v. Anderson, 114 Kan. 778, 227 Pac. 743 (1923), aff'd on rehearing,
116 Kan. 431, 227 Pac. 747 (1924).
14 7 TRAcHTmAN, op. cit. supra note 144.
14834 Cal. 2d 105, 207 P.2d 567 (1949).
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
151 CAL PROB. CODE § 106.
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taken in their technical sense,.., unless it satisfactorily appears that
the will was drawn solely by the testator, and that he was unac-
quainted with such technical sense."' 52 The statute enabled Justice
Traynor to avoid the technical meaning of "estate," that is, "degree,
quantity, nature, and extent of interest which a person has in real
property"'5 3 and reach the desired decision.'54
III. CONCLUSION
Section 2056(b) (5) states an important exception to the ter-
minable interest rule of the Internal Revenue Code. The purpose
of this exception was to equalize the tax consequences upon the de-
cedent's gross estate regardless of whether the couple lived in a com-
munity property or common law state. Unfortunately, the Internal
Revenue Code, the regulations, and the applicable case law have
caused this area to become unreasonably technical thereby impeding
the already difficult process of estate planning and disregarding the
intent of Congress.
WALLACE W. WALKER, JR.
152 Ibid.
1531n re Brunet's Estate, 34 Cal. 2d 105, 107, 207 P.2d 567, 568 (1949).
154 Compare Leary v. Liberty Trust Co., 272 Mass. 1, 171 N.E. 828 (1930), with
In re Brunet's Estate, 34 Cal. 2d 105, 207 P.2d 567 (1949).
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